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We show that the resolution of social dilemmas on random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by
imitating not the strategy of better performing players but rather their emotions. We assume sympathy and
envy as the two emotions that determine the strategy of each player by any given interaction, and we define
them as probabilities to cooperate with players having a lower and higher payoff, respectively. Starting with a
population where all possible combinations of the two emotions are available, the evolutionary process leads
to a spontaneous fixation to a single emotional profile that is eventually adopted by all players. However, this
emotional profile depends not only on the payoffs but also on the heterogeneity of the interaction network.
Homogeneous networks, such as lattices and regular random graphs, lead to fixations that are characterized by
high sympathy and high envy, while heterogeneous networks lead to low or modest sympathy but also low envy.
Our results thus suggest that public emotions and the propensity to cooperate at large depend, and are in fact
determined by the properties of the interaction network.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary games [1] have recently received ample at-
tention in the physics community, as it became obvious that
methods of statistical physics can be used successfully to
study also interactions that are more complex than just those
between particles [2]. Broadly classified as statistical physics
of social dynamics [3], these studies aim to elevate our un-
derstanding of collective phenomena in society on a level that
is akin to the understanding we have about interacting parti-
cle systems. Within the theoretical framework of evolution-
ary games, the evolution of cooperation [4] is probably the
most interesting collective phenomenon to study. Several evo-
lutionary games constitute so-called social dilemmas [5], the
most prominent of which is the prisoner’s dilemma game, and
in which understanding the evolution of cooperation still a
grand challenge. Regardless of game particularities, a social
dilemma implies that the collective wellbeing is at odds with
individual success. An individual is therefore tempted to act
so as to maximize her own profit, but at the same time neglect-
ing negative consequences this has for the society as a whole.
A frequently quoted consequence of such selfish actions is the
“tragedy of the commons” [6]. While cooperation is regarded
as the strategy leading away from the threatening social de-
cline, it is puzzling why individuals would choose to sacrifice
some fraction of personal benefits for the wellbeing of society.
According to Nowak [7], five rules promote the evolution
of cooperation. These are kin selection, direct and indirect
reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. Recent
reviews [8–11] clearly attest to the fact that physics-inspired
research has helped refine many of these concepts. In partic-
ular evolutionary games on networks, spurred on by the semi-
nal discovery of spatial reciprocity [12], and subsequently by
the discovery that scale-free networks strongly facilitate the
evolution of cooperation [13, 14], are still receiving ample at-
tention to this day [15–34]. One of the most recent contribu-
tions to the subject concerns the assignment of cognitive skills
to individuals that engage in evolutionary games on networks
[35, 38–41]. The earliest forerunners to these advances can be
considered strategies such as “tit-for-tat” [42] and Pavlov [43],
many of which were proposed already during the seminal ex-
periments performed by Axelrod [44], and which assume indi-
viduals have cognitive skills that exceed those granted to them
in the framework of classical game theory. It has recently been
shown, for example, that incipient cognition solves several
open question related to network reciprocity and that cognitive
strategies are particularly fit to take advantage of the ability of
heterogeneous networks to promote the evolution of coopera-
tion [39].
Here we build on our previous work [35], where we have
presented the idea that not strategies but rather emotions could
be the subject of imitation during the evolutionary process. It
is worth noting that the transmissive nature of positive and
negative emotional states was already observed in [36], where
it was concluded that humans really do adjust their emotions
depending on their contacts in a social network. Moreover,
the connection between intuition and willingness to cooper-
ate was also tested in human experiments [37]. It therefore
is of interest to determine how the topology of the interaction
network affects the spreading of emotions, which may in turn
determine the level of cooperation. In the context of games on
lattices, we have shown that imitating emotions such as good-
will and envy from the more successful players reinstalls im-
itation as a tour de force for resolving social dilemmas, even
for games where the Nash equilibrium is a mixed phase. We
have also argued that envy is an important inhibitor of coop-
erative behavior. We now revisit the snowdrift, stag-hunt and
the prisoner’s dilemma game on random graphs and scale-free
networks, with the aim of determining the role of interaction
heterogeneity within this framework. We focus on sympathy
and envy as the two key emotions determining the emotional
profile of each player, and we define them simply as the prob-
ability to cooperate with less and more successful opponents,
respectively. Strategies thus become link-specific rather than
2player-specific, whereby the level of cooperation in the pop-
ulation can be determined by the average number of times
players choose to cooperate. Interestingly, in agreement with
a recent experiment, we find that network reciprocity plays a
negligible role [45]. The outcome on regular random graphs is
the same as reported previously for the square lattice, leading
to the conclusion that the ability of cooperators to aggregate
into spatially compact clusters is irrelevant. Only when de-
gree heterogeneity is introduced to interaction networks, we
find that the evolution of emotional profiles changes. As we
will show, homogeneous networks lead to fixations that are
characterized by high sympathy and high envy, while hetero-
geneous networks lead to low or modest sympathy and low
envy. Network heterogeneity thus alleviates a key impedi-
ment to higher levels of cooperation on lattices and regular
networks, namely envy, and by doing so opens the possibility
to much more cooperative states even under extremely adverse
conditions. From a different point of view, it can be argued
that some topological features of interaction networks in fact
determine the emotional profiles of players, and they do so
in such a way that cooperation is the most frequently chosen
strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
we describe the mathematical model, in particular the proto-
col for the imitation of emotional profiles as well as the def-
inition of social dilemmas on networks. Next we present the
main results, whereas lastly we summarize and discuss their
implications.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The traditional setup of an evolutionary game assumes N
players occupying vertices of an interaction network. More-
over, each player x having a pure strategy, cooperates (sx =
C) or defects (sx = D) with all neighbors independently of
their strategy and payoff. Here, instead of pure strategies,
we introduce an emotional profile (αx, βx) ∈ [0.1] to each
player, which characterizes the willingness to cooperate to-
wards a neighbor in dependence on the other player’s success
that is quantified by the payoff value. More precisely, if the
corresponding payoff values are px and py for players x and
y, respectively, then αx determines the probability that player
x will cooperate with player y in case of px > py . Conversely,
when px < py , the parameter βx is the probability that player
x will cooperate with player y. In the rare case of equality
(px = py), the corresponding probability is the average of αx
and βx.
In this way the (αx, βx) pair thus determines how a given
player x will behave when facing less or a more successful
opponent y. As described in the Introduction, the pair deter-
mines each player’s sympathy and envy. If αx = 1 we say the
player is completely sympathetic. Alternative interpretations
such as goodwill and charity are also viable, given that player
x will always cooperate with less successful opponents. Sim-
ilarly, if β = 1 we say the player is not envious. Despite the
fact that the opponents are more successful, she will always
cooperate with them. As by αx, alternatives such as servility
or proneness to brownnose or “butter up” appear fit as well.
It is important to note that a player x may simultaneously co-
operate and defect towards neighbors y and y′ if their payoffs
are very different. Furthermore, player x may adopt different
strategies even if py ≈ py′ due to the probabilistic nature of
an emotional profile.
When two players engage in a round of an evolutionary
game, we assume that mutual cooperation yields the reward
R, mutual defection leads to punishment P , and the mixed
choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and the de-
fector the temptation T . Within this traditional setup we have
the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game if T > R > P > S, the
snowdrift game (SG) if T > R > S > P , and the stag-hunt
(SH) game if R > T > P > S, thus covering all three ma-
jor social dilemma types where players can choose between
cooperation and defection. Following common practice [8],
we set R = 1 and P = 0, thus leaving the remaining two
payoffs to occupy −1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2, as depicted
schematically in Fig. 1(a).
To begin, each player x is assigned a random (αx, βx) pair
and a payoff from the reachable [kS, kT ] interval, where k de-
notes the average degree of players. Subsequently, every pay-
off value is updated by considering the proper neighborhoods
of a player and the actual emotional parameters. Importantly,
after the accumulation of new payoffs, player y cannot imitate
a pure strategy from player x but only its emotional profile,
i.e., the αx and/or βx value. Imitation is decided so that a ran-
domly selected player x first acquires its payoff px by playing
the game with all its kx neighbors, as defined by the interac-
tion network. Note that kx is thus the degree of player x. Next,
one randomly chosen partner of x, denoted by y, also acquires
its payoff py by playing the game with all its ky neighbors.
Player y then attempts to imitate the emotional profile of play-
ers x with the probability q = 1/{1 + exp[(py − px)/K]},
whereK determines the level of uncertainty by strategy adop-
tions [8]. The latter can be attributed to errors in judgment due
to mistakes and external influences that affect the evaluation
of the opponent. Without loss of generality we set K = 0.5,
implying that better performing players are readily imitated,
but it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player per-
forming worse. Importantly, since the emotional profile con-
sist of two parameters, two random numbers are drawn to en-
able independent imitation of αx and βx. This is vital to avoid
potential artificial propagations of freak (extremely success-
ful) (αx, βx) pairs. Technically, 100×100 (αx, βx) pairs were
available at the start of the evolutionary process. Finally, af-
ter each imitation the payoff of player y is updated using its
new emotional profile, whereby each full Monte Carlo step
involves all players having a chance to adopt the emotional
profile from one of their neighbors once on average.
Prior to presenting the result of this model, it is important
to note that there will almost always be a fixation of (αx, βx)
pairs, i.e., irrespective of T and S only a single pair will even-
tually spread across the whole population. Once fixation oc-
curs the evolutionary process stops. The characteristic prob-
ability of encountering cooperative behavior in the popula-
tion, which is equivalent to the stationary fraction of coop-
erators fC in the traditional version of the game, can then be
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FIG. 1: Color map depicting the final values of α (left) and β (right)
on the T−S parameter plane, as obtained on a regular random graph.
The results are strikingly similar as obtained on a square lattice (see
[35]).
determined by means of averaging over the final states that
emerge from different initial conditions. Exceptions to sin-
gle (α, β) pair fixations are likely to occur for strongly het-
erogeneous networks, where more than one (αx, βx) pair can
survive around strong hubs. This effect is more pronounced
in the harmony game (HG) quadrant, but becomes negligi-
ble in the prisoner’s dilemma parametrization of the game.
In case more than a single (αx, βx) pair does survive, we
present in what follows the average over several independent
realizations. For the Monte Carlo simulations, we have used
N = 5000 − 40000 players and up to 107 full steps, and we
have averaged over 100− 500 independent runs.
III. RESULTS
We start by presenting results obtained on a regular random
graph [46] with k = 4, as it is a natural extension of a simple
square lattice population which we have considered before in
[35]. Importantly, while the degree distribution remains uni-
form, other topological features, like the presence of shortcuts
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FIG. 2: Degree distributions of random graphs with a gradually in-
creasing variance of degree (σ1 < σ2 < σ3 < σ4). For easier
reference the envelopes of discrete degree distributions are depicted
as well.
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FIG. 3: Color maps depicting the final values of α (top) and β (bot-
tom) on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained on random graphs
with degree distribution as depicted in Fig. 2. From left to right the
variance increases from σ1 to σ2 to σ3 to σ4, and hence increases also
the network heterogeneity. It can be observed that the higher the het-
erogeneity, the more the high-α low-β emotional profiles give way to
profiles that are characterized by low-α and high-β values. The tran-
sition is particularly pronounced in the snowdrift and the prisoner’s
dilemma quadrant, while for the stag-hunt and the harmony game the
outcome remains little affected.
or the emergence of a nonzero clustering coefficient, change
significantly. Previous works on games using pure strategies
highlighted that these details may play a significant role by the
evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas [47–49]. Figure 1
depicts the color map encoding the fixation values of α (left)
and β (right) on the T − S parameter plane. From the pre-
sented results it follows that if the governing social dilemma
is of the snowdrift type, players will always (never) cooperate
with their neighbors provided their payoff is lower (higher). In
the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant, we can observe either com-
plete dominance of defection regardless of the status of the
opponents, or the same situation as in the snowdrift quadrant
provided S is not too negative. For the stag-hunt and the har-
mony game the outcome is practically identical as obtained by
means of the traditional version of the two games. In general,
however, both color profiles differ only insignificantly from
the ones we have reported in [35] (see Figs. 2 and 3 there) for
the square lattice. This leads to the conclusion that the struc-
ture of interactions does not play a prominent role as long as
the degree of all players is uniform.
This leads to suspect that the heterogeneity of interactions
might play a pivotal role. We therefore depart from the regular
random graph to random graphs with different degree distri-
butions, as depicted in Fig. 2. We consider four different types
of random graphs with Gaussian distributed degree, yet with
increasing variance. According to the legend of Fig. 2, the
random graph with σ1 is thus the least heterogeneous (only
degrees k = 3, 4 and 5 are possible), while the random graph
with σ4 is the most heterogeneous. Increasing gradually the
variance from σ1 to σ4 thus enables us to monitor directly the
consequences of heterogeneity stemming from the interaction
network.
Color maps encoding the fixation values of α and β for the
four different random graphs are depicted in Fig. 3. By fol-
lowing the plots from left to right, it can be observed that as
the heterogeneity of the interaction network increases, the fix-
ation of profiles of both α and β change. By focusing on
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FIG. 4: Color map depicting the final values of α (left) and β (right)
on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained on a scale-free network.
The dominance of low and moderate α values and high β values is
even more pronounced than for the random graph with degree distri-
bution σ4 (compare with the two rightmost panels in Fig. 3). This fur-
ther strengthens the conclusion that, unlike homogeneous networks,
strong heterogeneity strongly favors the fixation of emotional profiles
that are characterized by low-α and high-β values.
the snowdrift and the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant, there is a
gradual shift from high-α low-β emotional profiles to low-α
and high-β values as heterogeneity increases. Accordingly,
taking into account also results presented in Fig. 1, we con-
clude that homogeneous interaction networks promote emo-
tions like sympathy and envy (α → 1 and β → 0), while
heterogeneous interaction network prefer indifference and ser-
vility (α → 0 and β → 1). It is worth highlighting that these
emotional profiles emerge completely spontaneously based on
payoff-driven imitation. The change is thus brought about ex-
clusively by the heterogeneity of the interaction network.
It is possible to take a step further in terms of the hetero-
geneity of the interaction network by considering scale-free
networks. We therefore make use of the standard model pro-
posed by Baraba´si and Albert [50]. Results presented in Fig. 4
further support our arguments, as the region of low and moder-
ate α values extends further into the snowdrift quadrant, while
at the same time low β values vanish more and more from
both the snowdrift and the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant. As
before, the harmony games and the stag-hunt quadrant remain
relatively unaffected, which corroborates the fact that the pro-
posed shift from the imitation of strategies to the imitation
of emotional profiles affect predominantly the social dilemma
games. It is also worth reminding that on scale-free networks
the fixation may not be unique because different hubs can
sustain their own micro-environment independently from the
other hubs. We therefore depict an average over several inde-
pendent realizations to arrive at representative results.
In order to obtain an understanding of the preference for
low-α and high-β values, as it is exerted by heterogeneous
interaction networks, it is of interest to examine the time evo-
lution of α and β values, as depicted in Fig. 5. The figure
shows the probability of any given (α, β) pair in the popula-
tion at different times increasing from top left to bottom right.
It can be observed that high-α – high-β combinations die out
first. These players cooperate with both their more and less
successful opponents, and they do so with a high probability.
In agreement with well-known results concerning the evolu-
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FIG. 5: Time evolution of fixation of α and β, as obtained for
T = 1.5 and S = −0.1 on the scale-free network. From top left
to bottom right we have the temporary distribution of (αx, βx) pairs
at 1, 100, 1000 and 100000 full Monte Carlo steps using N = 5000
players. It can be observed that high values of α are the first to van-
ish. Gradually then also the remaining low β values give way to the
complete dominance of low-α and high-β emotional profiles.
tion of cooperation in spatial social dilemmas [8], the bulk of
cooperators is always the first to die out. Only after their ar-
rangement in suitable compact domains the cooperators can
take advantage of network reciprocity and prevail against de-
fectors. In our case, however, this does not happen, i.e., the
“always cooperate” players never recover. Instead, the evolu-
tion proceeds by eliminating also all pairs which contain mod-
erate and high α values, until finally the only surviving low-α
profiles are left to compete. However, preserving at least some
form of cooperation may yield an evolutionary advantage, and
thus ultimately the low-α – high-β emotional profile emerges
as the only remaining. Notably, the described scenario is char-
acteristic only for heterogeneous networks. For homogeneous
networks the differences between players are more subtle, and
indeed it is not at all obvious that cooperating with the more
successful neighbors would confer an evolutionary advantage.
Accordingly, high-β profiles are not viable and die out. Co-
operation can thrive only on the expense of high α values, as
reported already in [35].
Importantly though, given an appropriately heterogeneous
interaction network, the low-α – high-β emotional profile
can be very much beneficial for the global cooperation level.
To support this statement, we present in Fig. 6 the average
frequency of cooperation as obtained on the regular random
graph (left) and the scale-free network (right). Note that the
former in general represent homogeneous graphs. The com-
parison reveals that a much higher cooperation level can be
sustained, especially in the snowdrift quadrant, if the dominat-
ing emotions are neither sympathy nor envy. To confirm this
further, we have manually imposed a high-α – low-β emo-
tional profile on the scale-free network. While this profile is
optimal for homogeneous networks (compare also Fig. 6 (left)
with Fig. 4 in [35]) the outcome on heterogeneous networks
is disappointing, yielding no more than a modest cooperation
level of fC ≈ 0.30 − 0.35 in the most challenging snowdrift
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FIG. 6: Color map depicting the final probability of cooperative be-
havior fC on the T − S parameter plane, as obtained on the reg-
ular random graph (left) and the scale-free network (right). Since
the probability to cooperate should be seen equal to the stationary
fraction of cooperators in the traditional version of the game, a com-
parison of presented results (compare with Fig. 1 in [35]) reveals that
replacing the imitation of strategies with the imitation of emotional
profiles strongly promotes the evolution of cooperation. Even more
so if the interaction network is strongly heterogeneous.
and prisoner’s dilemma regions. This imposes another inter-
esting conclusion, namely, if the emotional profiles of players
can evolve freely as dictated by payoff-driven imitation mi-
croscopic dynamics, then the topology “selects” the optimal
profile in order to produce the highest attainable cooperation
level.
Lastly, it is instructive to explore how the low-α – high-
β emotional profile actually works on scale-free networks.
A visualization is possible by measuring separately the av-
erage willingness to cooperate for players who have differ-
ent degree. Since the payoff of every player is obtained from
the pairwise interaction constituted by each individual link, a
higher degree k therefore in general leads to a higher payoff
and also a higher “social prestige”. As Fig. 7 illustrates, play-
ers with low degree will dominantly cooperate with their op-
ponents that have a higher degree and thus most likely a higher
payoff. In other words, they can use the “β-part” of their emo-
tional profile. This act of cooperation, however, is unilateral
because the hubs rarely compensate it. Due to low values
of α cooperation with the less successful players is strongly
suppressed. What is more, while players with a higher de-
gree also cooperate with the more successful opponents (they
have the same emotional profile and hence the same high β),
this action is very rare given that there are simply not many
who would be superior. It is sad but still true that the hubs
with the highest degree very rarely cooperate in the stationary
state. Despite this rather unfriendly behavior of the “leaders”,
the average cooperation level is still acceptable and in fact re-
markably high even under adverse conditions (e.g., T = 1.5
and S = −0.1), but this is exclusively because the inferior
players do their best and virtually always cooperate towards
their superiors.
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FIG. 7: The average willingness to cooperate in dependence on de-
gree, as obtained for T = 1.5 and S = −0.1 on the scale-free
network. Fully in agreement with the dominant low-α and high-β
emotional profile, it can be observed that hubs very rarely cooperate,
while the masses do so almost always. Depicted result is an aver-
age over 500 independent runs at N = 5000 after 107 Monte Carlo
steps. The average cooperation level is ≈ 0.6.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have shown that high levels of cooperation can evolve
amongst self-interested individuals if instead of strategies they
adopt simple emotional profiles from their neighbors. Since
the imitation was governed solely by the payoffs of players,
we have made no additional assumptions concerning the mi-
croscopic dynamics. The later has been governed by the tra-
ditional “follow the more successful” rule, which we have
implemented with some leeway due to the Fermi function.
Starting from an initial configuration with all possible emo-
tional profiles, we have determined the one that remains after
sufficiently long relaxation (only in the harmony game quad-
rant, if staged on heterogeneous networks, the fixation may
not be unique). We have found that the fixation depends not
only on the parametrization of the game, but even more so
on the topology of the interaction network. More precisely,
the topology-induced heterogeneity of players has been iden-
tified as the most important property. If players were staged
on a network where their degree was equal, then indepen-
dently of other topological properties of the network the fix-
ation occurred on emotional profiles characterized by high α
and low β values in the interesting payoff region. In agree-
ment with the definition of α and β, these are players charac-
terized by high sympathy but also high envy. This profile is
also in agreement with the one reported earlier in [35] for the
square lattice. On heterogeneous networks, however, the fix-
ation is most likely to be on low or moderate values of α and
high values of β. Accordingly, we have the prevalence of low
sympathy (charity, goodwill) for those that are doing worse,
but also little envy (high servility, proneness to brownnose or
“suck up”) towards those that are doing better. Noteworthy,
although we have not presented actual results, the applica-
tion of payoffs normalized with the degree of players returns
6the same results as observed on homogeneous networks. This
observation is in agreement with our preliminary expectation
because it is well established that the scale-free topology in-
troduces a strong heterogeneity amongst players, but also that
this effect is effectively diminished by applying normalized
payoffs or degree-sensitive cost [51–55]. Accordingly, in the
latter case players become “equal”, which results in the selec-
tion of emotional profile we have recorded for regular graphs.
This observation strengthens further our argument that indeed
solely the heterogeneity of players is crucial for the selection
of the dominant emotional profile.
We thus may argue that on heterogeneous networks each
“dictators’ dream” profile can evolve via a simple evolution-
ary rule. The majority may not be happy about it because the
combination of moderate α and high β values is not neces-
sarily the most coveted personality profile. Yet as our study
shows, it does have its social advantages. Namely, in the ab-
sence of envy or in the presence of servility the cooperation
level in the whole population can be maintained relatively
very high, even if the conditions for the evolution of coop-
eration are extremely adverse (high T , low S). In this sense,
we conclude that charity and envy are easily outperformed by
competitiveness and proneness to please the dominant play-
ers, and that indeed this profile emerges completely sponta-
neous. Put differently, it can be argued that it is in fact chosen
by the heterogeneity amongst players that is introduced by an
appropriate interaction network.
We would also like to emphasize that the discussed “emo-
tional profiles” do not necessarily cover the broader psycho-
logical interpretation of the term [56]. We have used this ter-
minology to express the liberty of each individual to act differ-
ently towards different partners in dependence on the differ-
ences in social rank (or success), which traditional strategies
in the context of evolutionary games do not allow. As such,
and in the absence of considering further details determining
our personality, our very simple model naturally cannot be
held accountable for describing actual human behavior. In-
stead, it reveals the topology of interactions as a crucial prop-
erty that determines the collective behavior of a social net-
work. According to our observations, it is indeed the hetero-
geneity of the interaction network that is key in determining
our willingness to help others.
Finally, we emphasize that in the present model cooper-
ation is maintained without reciprocity. The mechanism at
work here is very different from those discussed thoroughly
in previous studies. Unlike direct and indirect reciprocity,
network reciprocity, or even reputation, punishment and re-
ward, which are all deeply routed in the fact that neighboring
cooperators will help each other out while at the same time
neighboring defectors will craft their own demise, here the
nature of links determines the winner. It may well happen that
cooperation and defection occur along the same link, yet still
the status of the population as a whole is very robust. What
players really share is the way how to behave towards each
other under different circumstances, which is determined
within the framework of an emotional profile.
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